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Young Georg Lukács as a Crisis  
Thinker
Subjectivism and the Problem of Form
›Crisis‹ was a buzzword among European intel-
lectuals at the turn of the 20th century. A nebu-
lous notion which can indicate both imminent 
decline and potential renewal, ›crisis‹ at the same 
time suggests the need for a decision or for a 
new project. As such, it combines a broad and 
largely metaphorical semantic repertoire with a 
perlocutionary sense of urgency and potential 
culpability.1 It possesses the communicative pow-
er to assign blame and responsibility and thereby 
justify radical courses of action. Yet it simulta-
neously serves as a way to attribute problems, 
uncertainties, and suffering to a generalizing 
periodization of time, in some sense abstracting 
them and mitigating our need to attend to the 
details. One explanation for why crisis became so 
fashionable a trope in early 20th century Europe 
was because it was able to draw together a wide 
range of different and contradictory negative 
sentiments into a vague consensus about the 
fallen state of the world.2 Using crisis this way 
1 Koselleck: Crisis; Roitman: Anti-crisis.
2 Graf/Föllmer: The Culture of ›Crisis‹ in the Weimar Republic; 
Ringer: The Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 259–260.
This paper argues that 
the work of the young 
Lukács can be read as a 
wide-ranging mediation on 
what I am labelling ›the 
crisis of subjectivism‹. 
Reading Lukács this way 
allows us to see important 
continuities between his 
pre-Marxist and Marxist 
period. Most significantly, 
it allows us to see how 
positing the proletariat 
as a ›subject-object‹ of 
history and developing a 
crisis diagnosis of bourgeois 
society, allowed Lukács to 
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can bring highly complex and interconnected events under conceptual 
control by giving them a common origin and consequence, as well as an 
apparent beginning and end. This has been the recurrent trope of crisis 
thinking from the late 18th century up until the recent discourse on the 
›Global Financial Crisis‹ of 2008.3 Theories of crisis may therefore serve as 
complexity-reducing devices which allow us to perform a kind of cognitive 
ordering that allow us to grasp historical time as a definite, bounded thing.
I think this is unquestionably true for Georg Lukács’s famous 1923 es-
say Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat (Verdinglichung und 
das Bewußtsein des Proletariats),4 which has since become a touchstone for 
crisis thinking in much of the Western Marxist tradition. In that essay, the 
cognitive ordering is performed through a periodization of ›the commodity 
form‹ which is, for Lukács, the key to unlocking the contradictory logics of 
capitalist modernity as a totality, while also constituting the original source 
of crisis for that totality. The crisis is key to disclosing the collective agency 
of proletariat, who are in turn attributed the agency to transcend a social 
order grounded in commodification.5 Yet what is interesting about the essay 
is how little Lukács engages with the experiences of inequality and hard-
ship faced by proletarians. This stands in contrast to Marx, whose Capital 
energetically condemns the spiritual and physical degradation of workers 
wrought by the factory system.6 For Lukács, the problem with capitalism 
seems to be less its class injustices (although he certainly was not blind to 
them), and far more the impoverishment of philosophy, ethics and culture 
he thought modernity had engendered. In the 1923 essay, ›crisis‹ is the cog-
nitive ordering device through which a broad range of aporia, which had 
preoccupied Lukács prior to his membership with the Communist Party, 
are re-described. Revolution could then become the practical historical 
solution to the problem of form.
This chapter argues that the work of the young Lukács can be read as a 
wide-ranging mediation on what I am labelling ›the crisis of subjectivism‹. 
Reading Lukács this way allows us to see important continuities between 
his pre-Marxist and Marxist period. Most significantly, it allows us to see 
how positing the proletariat as a ›subject-object‹ of history and developing 
a crisis diagnosis of bourgeois society, allowed Lukács to bring the fruits of 
his earlier intellectual labour under conceptual control.
3 Thompson: The Metamorphosis of a Crisis, p. 59.
4 Lukács: Reification and the Class Consciousness of the Proletariat.
5 See chapter 2 of Gilbert: The Crisis Paradigm.
6 Marx: Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Esp. chapter 15.
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1. Crisis-consciousness
The ›crisis-consciousness‹ which proliferated around central Europe at the 
turn of the 20th century turned on a perceived exhaustion of Occidental ra-
tionality, and concerns about the relativism, moral decline and decadence of 
European civilization.7 The German idealist tradition had, since Kant, been 
occupied with the philosophical problem of subjectivism.8 This problem, 
sometimes described as the ›crisis of the Enlightenment‹,9 concerned the 
inability of post-Enlightenment thought to appeal to any enduring standards 
of truth or value. This threatened a scepticism where all judgements and 
ethical positions were no more valid than arbitrary choices or opinions. 
When in Germany, Lukács was immersed in this intellectual tradition via 
the neo-Kantianism, in which he was trained, and which shaped his out-
look considerably. Neo-Kantians saw the philosophical positivism of their 
time as too closely indebted to the natural sciences, and thereby unable to 
account for humanistic qualities which could not be known or explained 
through a natural scientific method alone. In response, they sought to es-
tablish the philosophical (conceptual) ground for the human sciences as an 
independent domain of enquiry. This effort was accompanied by somewhat 
conservative concerns that modern Europe was becoming a decadent and 
materialistic culture and was losing its connection with subject-independent 
ethical and aesthetic values. They were attempting to account for value in 
a non-material and non-subjective way, which could preserve its integrity 
from subjective scepticism or psychologism on the one hand, and causal 
materialism on the other.10
Two of Lukács’s most important mentors of the early 1910s, Georg 
Simmel and Max Weber, were taking up these problems in sociological 
and cultural terms. For Weber, rationality had become an ›iron cage‹ which 
colonized culture and the value sphere and deprived us of any greater sense 
of purpose than that of material gain, rational efficiency or control. The 
modern world was ›disenchanted‹, and human individuals struggled to 
connect meaning or purpose to their worldly activity. Efforts to reawaken 
spirit and find communion or redemption in political and social causes 
could only make things worse.11 Simmel described a ›tragedy of culture‹ or 
7 Harrison: 1910.
8 Beiser: German Idealism.
9 Beiser: The Romantic Imperative, p. 45.
10 Beiser: The German Historicist Tradition.
11 Weber: Science as a Vocation; Weber: Politics as a Vocation; Weber: The Protestant Ethic.
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a ›crisis of culture‹, where cultural forms had taken on lives of their own, 
directed towards their own ends. The human being as the ultimate end was 
increasingly eclipsed by the ends of cultural media themselves; like money, 
social conventions and social organization.12 Both Weber and Simmel saw 
only two possible outcomes to this trend: either a resilient and heroic indi-
vidualism or the total disenchantment and regimentation of modern life.13
The young Lukács resisted this fatalism. He was calling for artists to 
find ways of representing this crisis through their work, seeing in this the 
possibility for giving form to a new, modern ethos which could again con-
nect individual subjects with a more stable sense of shared human values. 
If we define ›crisis consciousness‹ as the ability to identify crises and take 
action,14 Lukács can be read as attempting to stimulate artists into express-
ing and disseminating a crisis consciousness aesthetically. Hence, Lukács 
explored the idea that the representation and examination of the crisis 
through literature, theatre and painting was crucial in finding the cultural 
forms through which modernity could find renewal. He particularly queried 
whether this was just a question of finding the right technique or artistic 
method, or whether such a cultural revival could only come as a result of a 
more general ethical turn among society at large.
2. Crisis Reflected into Modern Drama
Lukács’s first major published work was a study on the History of Modern 
Drama (Entwicklungsgeschichte des modernen Dramas [1909]).15 Near the 
end of his life, he retrospectively summarized its thesis as »modern drama 
is not just the product of crisis, but crisis expressed in all its elements«.16 
His approach was to undertake a comparative historical sociology of drama 
to contrast the new world with an old one and thereby paint modernity 
as spiritually and ethically barren. Looking at medieval tragedies, Lukács 
explains how pre-modern forms of art exemplify a »unity« between »men’s 
relations and dependencies«.17 That is, they express the spiritual unity of 
the social and cultural order they are formed in. This has consequences 
12 Simmel: The Concept and Tragedy of Culture; Simmel: The Philosophy of Money; Simmel: The 
Crisis of Culture.
13 Liebersohn: Fate And Utopia, p. 191.
14 Milstein: Thinking Politically about Crisis, p. 143.
15 Lukács: History of the Modern Drama.
16 Lukács: Record of a Life, pp. 149–150.
17 Lukács: The Sociology of Modern Drama, p. 153.
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for the performance because within a homogeneous community, theatrical 
performances can relate to the audience in an immediate way. The audience 
is able to experience themselves as a trans-subjective mass and lose them-
selves in the event. The modern world – and modern theatre – has lost this 
capacity. According to Lukács, the ability of theatre to convey clear and 
potent narratives to ecstatic audiences is inhibited by the dissonance and 
differentiation of modern life.
Lukács employs sociological explanations inspired by Simmel and Marx 
to elaborate: Technological know-how in the pre-modern world was passed 
on through the interpersonal relations between masters and apprentices. 
These roles gave the individual the opportunity to express themselves via 
their labour, allowing work to function as a means for fulfilment and per-
sonal development. It also reaffirmed their rootedness in a community, 
as they performed a clear functional role which benefited the collective. 
Lukács argues that morality in such a context must become oriented toward 
reinforcing constraint, as individuals each performed functionally necessary 
interdependent roles within an integrated social totality. However, this was 
not a stifling conformism, as on »all occasions [individuals had] the op-
portunity to inject [...] personality into the order of things«18 through their 
deeds. The ›totality‹ here indicates an idealized past where everyone’s social 
role is mutually confirmed, and through participation in this functional 
order, one’s identity finds both its expression and its confirmation.
The modern world, by contrast, is stuck in a paradox between uni-
formity and extreme individualism.19 Modern capitalist society brings 
bureaucracy, technology, industrialism, and new forms of education which 
are all subject to uniform objective standards. Lukács calls this process 
›thingification‹ or ›reification‹ (›Versachlichung‹), and it blocks the pas-
sage of subjectivity expression into the world of objects.20 Modern society 
extinguishes individual human peculiarities as they become inefficiencies 
which only contaminate the mechanised system. Any human meaning of 
productive activity evaporates as everything becomes solely determined by 
the imperatives of capital accumulation and mechanized efficiency: »An 
objective abstraction, capital, becomes the true productive agent in capitalist 
economy, and it scarcely has an organic relation with the personality of its 
accidental owner; indeed, personality may often become superfluous [...].«21 
18 Ibid., pp. 153–154.
19 Ibid., p. 152.
20 Harrison: 1910, p. 106.
21 Lukács: The Sociology of Modern Drama, p. 153.
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Against this growing uniformity and standardization of the object world, 
through which the human subject is denied objective expression, modern 
cultural values become oriented toward liberation and escape. Social bonds 
and communal ties come to be seen as burdens and limits on the individual 
will. Work no longer provides any satisfaction as it is dictated by impersonal 
forces and is performed only for survival. This change from the pre-modern 
to the modern can be observed in modern drama:
In summary: where the tragedy was previously brought on by the particular direction 
taken by the will, the mere act of willing suffices to induce it in the new tragedy. [...] [S]
urvival as an individual, the integrity of individuality, becomes the vital centre of [modern] 
drama. Indeed the bare fact of Being begins to turn tragic.22
The tragedy of the modern individual is not that they failed to constrain 
their hubris and incurred the wrath of the fates, but rather the opposite: It 
is being there in the first place. It is being unable to find escape or release 
from a hostile, mechanical world of humanity’s own making. The preser-
vation of personality becomes the primary concern of the modern subject, 
who is forced to internalize their struggles. This finds representation in the 
dramatization of complex conflicts and misunderstandings between inner 
convictions and competing ideologies.
Lukács’s diagnosis of modern drama – and by extension, modern life as a 
whole – is that it tragically represents »the fact that realization of personality 
will be achieved only at the price of suppressing the personalities of others«.23 
Modern individuals cannot achieve mutual recognition because the modern 
world forces them to objectify each other as vessels for the realization of 
their will. Moreover, they fail to find mutually recognizable cultural objects 
or actions through which they can reach any common ground.
Lukács argues that this poses an aesthetic problem for the dramatic 
form. Drama, which is performed on a stage and in front of an audience, 
must take place through the interaction of characters with each other, and 
with and through their common world. However, if modern individuals 
share no commonly recognisable values or standards, and if the world of 
objects they inhabit is determined by hostile external forces, achieving any 
reliable content for drama becomes doubtful. The ›lack of a vital centre of 
life‹, obstructs the ability of dramatists to find any shared sense of meaning 
with an audience, through which dramatic actions can become intelligible.24 
In response, the source of mutual intelligibility can only become the frac-
22 Ibid., p. 154.
23 Ibid., p. 160.
24 Hartley: Georg Lukács and the Disintegration of Dramatic Form.
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ture and discord of modern alienation itself. Only in this way can we find 
a background which we all share in common and in reference to which our 
utterances and actions can be comprehensible to one and other. For Lukács, 
the fate of modern drama rests on its ability to successfully render the trag-
edy of modernity into common consciousness through the dramatic form.
My reading of Lukács’s position is that he is calling upon art to aes-
theticize the lived experience of what would come to be called ›the crisis 
of modernity‹, thereby giving a recognizable and unified expression to the 
shared circumstances of modern individuals. Through this aestheticization 
of loneliness and isolation, individuals are able to regain a sense of commun-
ion; they are able to see themselves in each other. Crisis becomes a cultural 
form that artists must take up and render into artistic expression in order to 
connect to their audience in a meaningful way. The disenchantment which 
follows the decline of religion and community is answered by a reawaken-
ing, where we all recognise that we share this spiritual wasteland together. 
The pre-modern totality of a functional and enchanted communal order is 
replaced by a modern totality of generalized diremption and disintegration. 
Lukács is encouraging us to think of modernity as marked by crisis, not 
because he wants to celebrate and exacerbate the discord as later modernist 
movements would, but because he thinks that sharing the experience of 
crisis contains the only possibility for our collective redemption.
3. The Longing for Form
Similar themes are found in Soul and Form (Die Seele und die Formen 
[1910]),25 which consists of a selection of Lukács’s early literary criticism. The 
personnel Lukács chooses to discuss in the essays include some obscure and 
marginal figures. However, what is of interest is not the specifics of Lukács’s 
literary criticism, or the works in question, but the way he uses criticism to 
flesh out a conceptual apparatus which can perform crisis diagnosis. In other 
words, I am reading Soul and Form as a preliminary attempt to construct 
a crisis paradigm with which he can read and judge modern works of art 
as failing on cultural terms. As Lukács explains in his introductory essay, 
he is searching for a way to articulate the problem of form, or the absence 
of form in modern culture; and he explains why the essay, as a form itself, 
is uniquely suited to this task. His hope is that by establishing the longing 
for form through his essayistic criticism, and by clarifying the aims of tho-
25 Lukács: Soul and Form.
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se artists who also share this longing, he will prompt a rediscovery of the 
problem of form which will illuminate the absent centre of modern life. 
Even though Lukács does not describe his problem as a crisis at this point, 
his approach is typical of crisis thinking: By knowing about the crisis of 
form, we are obliged to pursue the problem of form as an ethical priority. 
In crisis, what matters most or what is most essential is the thrust into the 
foreground of consciousness, and what is a distraction, or an illusion can 
be abandoned. Lukács thereby evaluates the artistic merit of works on the 
basis of whether they take crisis seriously or not. This will become clearer 
in the next subsection on his criticism of impressionism.
Lukács’s central claims in Soul and Form revolve around three concepts; 
›soul‹, ›form‹ and ›life‹.26 Rather than recalling Lukács’s enigmatic and ba-
roque descriptions of these concepts, I will attempt to define them in clearer 
terms. This, it may be justifiably argued, does not do justice to the subtlety 
of Lukács’s text. However, for the purposes of this thesis, a straightforward 
explanation will allow us to better see the structure of Lukács argument, 
and therefore permit a clearer view of his development of a crisis paradigm.
›Soul‹ consists of the judgements, emotions and dispositions which 
individuals have. The problem of subjectivism arises when the contents of 
the soul are deemed insecure and arbitrary. The subject lacks any means by 
which they can assess the contents of their soul, or another soul, as valid or 
invalid. Judgements therefore seem like individual choices which could just 
as easily be otherwise. In the classical Kantian scheme, the inner realm of 
subjective judgement, the soul, confronts an external world of factual and 
causal objects. But the ability of the soul to judge the content of that exter-
nal world is in doubt. The question is posed: What makes my judgements 
valid? This is intensified in a modern society where there are a plurality 
of individual perspectives and individual judgements, without a necessary 
ethical centre to which all can refer.
As Lukács asserts, ›form‹ was unproblematic in the pre-modern world 
because it was implicit in the religions, cosmologies, and communal relations 
which people accepted without question. These served as the standards 
against which individual judgements could be validated. However, in a 
modern world, where religion, cosmology and communities are under-
mined by the causal rationality of the natural sciences, and the scepticism 
of Enlightenment reason, such a source of validity is now absent. Individual 
judgements are irrelevant to physical forces, which happen whether people 
want them to or not. Lukács often refers to form as a Platonist idea, and 
26 Márkus: Life and the Soul, pp. 4–6.
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celebrates Plato, »the greatest essayist who ever lived or wrote«,27 for his 
›form-giving‹ and his clear understanding of the problem. This makes ex-
plicit the transcendental connotations behind Lukács’s conception of form.
›Form‹, in Lukács’s view, is supposed to function as the medium by 
which soul finds meaning in life. Life consists of the content of our expe-
riences, what we perceive throughout interaction with the world. Viewed 
scientifically, life is an aggregate of facts about things. For Lukács, this is 
an impoverished perspective on life which denies its human significance. 
The longing for form consists of a search for the enduring source of value 
by which soul can know whether its judgements about things or actions in 
the world are valid.28 Another way to describe the absence of form in more 
contemporary terms is as a ›crisis of meaning‹. A life without form has no 
sense of a ground or a centre with which to connect the various strands 
together.
This is the most profound meaning of form: to lead to a great moment of silence, to mould 
the directionless, precipitous, many-coloured stream of life as though all its haste were only 
for the sake of such moments. Written works differ from each other for no other reason 
than that the abysses can be reached by many paths, and that our questions always arise out 
of a new astonishment. Forms are natural necessities for no other reason than that there is 
only one path leading to the abyss from any one place. A question, with life all around it; 
a silence, with a rustling, a noise, a music, a universal singing all round it: that is form.29
In his early work, Lukács sees form as a cultural or ethical problem. It also 
has strong artistic connotations, as artistic forms, but Lukács does not always 
define it in such a limited way. Form is the background structures of our 
understanding and expectations; what we share in common and appeal to 
when communicating or expressing ourselves, and which Lukács thinks 
should be coherent and unify us with our worldly existence.
One way of reading an overall thesis into Soul and Form is to say that 
Lukács holds that art must articulate a sense of crisis if it is going to be 
both intelligible and meaningful to a modern audience. In his essays, he 
celebrates the works of authors and artists who are able to find beauty and 
27 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 13 (»den größten Essayisten, der je gelebt und geschrieben hat«, Die 
Seele und die Formen, p. 38).
28 Ibid., p. 173.
29 Ibid., p. 114 (»Und der tiefste Sinn der Formen ist dieser: hinführen zum großen Augenblick 
eines großen Verstummens und die ziellos dahinschießende Buntheit des Lebens so zu gestalten, 
als eile sie nur um solcher Augenblicke willen. Und nur weil man die Abgründe von vielerlei 
Aufstiege erreichen kann, weil unsere Fragen aus immer anderem Erstaunen auftauchen, nur 
darum sind die Schriftwerke auch verschieden. Und weil aus einer Gegend doch nur ein Weg 
zum Gipfel führt, nur darum sind die Formen Naturnotwendigkeiten. Eine Frage und um sie 
herum das Leben; ein Verschweigen und ringsherum und davor und dahinter das Rauschen, 
das Lärmen, die Musik, der Allgesang: das ist die Form.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 160).
Gilbert: Young Lukács as a crisis thinker ZGB 29/2020, 15–37
24
significance in the harshness of the modern world, thereby representing the 
absence of the problem, and opening up the possibility of new forms. At 
the same time, he condemns those artistic trends, such as impressionism, 
which prettify and soften modernity for the consuming audience. In the 
pre-war European society, which celebrated scientific advances as progress, 
and frequently mistook scientific achievements for cultural and ethical ones, 
the inability of such art to relate people and their world in a meaningful 
way becomes articulated by Lukács and his contemporaries as a cultural 
crisis. Lukács sees his role in this to explain to artists what they are doing, 
to clarify philosophically what they are groping for aesthetically, in order 
to clarify the problems that modern culture faces and awaken a longing for 
the great aesthetic.30
Within Soul and Form, Lukács surveys a number of different strategies 
for giving form to life. An essay on Kierkegaard describes his leap into an 
authentic relation with God, the purity of which is ultimately dissolved 
under the pressure of other people’s conflicting interpretations – his former 
lover’s – as well as the poisonous psychology of self-doubt. The lesson of 
this is that all individualistic attempts to arbitrarily create form as an act of 
one’s will become a futile battle against the contingency of social existence.31 
An essay on Theodor Storm shows Lukács romanticizing early modern 
small-town Puritan Burghers, as a last vestige of genuine communal life.32 
He observes Storm within this environment, as a poet and storyteller who 
is a fully integrated member of the social fabric. This gave Storm’s writing a 
coherence and simplicity where each individual life convincingly works as 
an »element of that whole from which a great epic shall one day be made«.33 
After admiring the ethically assured and stoically resilient characters which 
Storm portrays, Lukács laments that they are now relics of a lost world. He 
therefore rejects the fantasy of a romantic return to rural simplicity as naive.
Lukács reserves his praise for artists like Stefan George, Charles-Louis 
Philippe and Richard Beer-Hofmann who turn the absence of a totalizing 
worldview into the basis of their work, thereby approaching form in a 
modern context. While George and Philippe both bring out the subtlety 
and intimacy of modern social contact, Beer-Hofmann shows the fragil-
ity of modern self-absorption through his characters’ encounters with 
30 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
31 Ibid., p. 36.
32 Ibid., pp. 62–63.
33 Ibid., p. 65 (»als ob alles Einzelne nur eine Ballade oder ein Balladenfragment wäre, ein Element 
jener Materie, aus welcher dereinst ein großes Epos entstehen soll«, Die Seele und die Formen, 
p. 102).
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death. Likewise, in the essay The Metaphysics of Tragedy (Metaphysik der 
Tragödie),34 Lukács discusses the neoclassical dramatist Paul Ernst, who 
attempts to return to a more austere and Sophoclean style of tragic drama. 
For Ernst, tragedy was always about encountering the transcendental a priori 
limits of a life or a personality, or »a categorical imperative of greatness and 
self-perfection«,35 as Lukács puts it. Tragedy conveys to us timeless truths 
concerning the interrelation of freedom and necessity, the inevitability of 
death, the imperative toward realizing self-perfection; disclosing existential 
limits which ground our subjectivity.36 Through tragedy »the soul becomes 
conscious of itself because it is thus limited, and only because and insofar as 
it is limited«.37 However, to convey this tragedy requires great individuals to 
carry out their actions to the very end with a single-minded purposiveness 
and determination. It is only when observing the actions of exemplary and 
uncompromising individuals that existential limits become apparent. The 
modern world relativizes, historicizes and democratizes great individuals 
away, and in doing so threatens to dissolve the possibility of there being 
such tragic heroes at all.
4. The Poverty of Aesthetic Culture
In two essays from 1910 called Aesthetic Culture and The Parting of the 
Ways, Lukács provides some clear diagnostic statements describing cultural 
decline. He argues that modern culture has been overcome by passive opti-
mism, evident in the impoverished products of many contemporary trends 
in art. His immediate targets are the impressionists, whom he accuses of 
responding to the loss of form by essentially accommodating themselves 
to it. He sees such arts as self-consciously spurning any integration within 
a wider system of meaning or ethics and focusing instead on the transitory 
suspension of reality for pleasing aesthetic effect. This, he suggests, shows 
that the bourgeoisie are no longer even concerned with articulating a 
worldview in any coherent way, and are instead satisfied with debased and 
superficial experiences. For Lukács, these works are symptomatic of the 
34 Lukács: The Metaphysics of Tragedy.
35 Ibid., pp. 197–198 (»zu einem kategorischen Imperativ der Größe und der Selbstvollendung«, 
Die Seele und die Formen, p. 233).
36 Goldmann: The Early Writings of Georg Lukács; Marr: Theory and Practice in the Dramas of 
Paul Ernst.
37 Lukács: Soul and Form, pp. 197–198 (»zum Selbstbewußtsein Erwachen der Seele: sie ist, weil 
sie begrenzt ist; ist nur, weil und insofern sie begrenzt ist«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 217).
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crisis, and from the position of his crisis narrative, he is able to judge them 
as aesthetic failures.
This trend, according to Lukács, had become the cultural centre of bour-
geois society. He puts things in simple terms; the task of culture should be to 
provide stable guidance for »life-problems«.38 But modern culture had either 
become confused with scientific progress or degraded into consumerism. A 
strong culture, grounded in a metaphysics of form, can reveal to the indi-
vidual where they fit into the totality, and what their individual fate is. This 
needs to be something of objective necessity, something binding and certain, 
and not a mere subjective disposition or inclination, which will always be 
prone to change and vulnerable to scepticism.39 The pathology of modern 
culture, or the pathological lack of culture, pertains to its subjectivism and 
historical relativism, which rejects the permanence of everything: »With 
the end of the solidity of things the solidity of the ego also ceased to exist; 
and the loss of facts meant the loss of values.«40 Everything in the modern 
world becomes merely perspectival. All values are held individually and 
are therefore arbitrarily and incidentally posited. Nothing seems to matter.
This cultural pathology is exemplified, according to Lukács, in forms 
of impressionism, which become »the art of surfaces; surfaces behind 
which there is nothing, surfaces which signify nothing«.41 Lukács sees in 
impressionism nothing but a facile satisfaction of momentary desires which 
absorbs the audience in immediate sensations and pleasures. It is an art form 
of convenience, as it demands no struggle, no effort and no obligation. It 
constructs joyful and comforting images or atmospheres which the con-
sumer can simply take or leave at their leisure. An aestheticism such as this 
offers no challenge to the status-quo, and no secure grounds for affirming 
human values, and therefore slides easily into its place within the division 
of labour of a bureaucratized and rationalised society. The aesthete becomes 
another professional among the many, whose particular specialization is the 
manipulation of aesthetic effects and the creation of moods for consumption 
by the bourgeois intelligentsia.42
As Kadarkay suggests,43 Lukács’s criticisms of impressionism are ungen-
erous. He subjects it to both the demanding and specific requirements of his 
theory of culture, as well as to his austere dislike for all things ornamental 
38 Lukács: Aesthetic Culture, p. 376.
39 Ibid., pp. 377–378.
40 Lukács: The Parting of the Ways, p. 168.
41 Ibid., p. 169.
42 Lukács: Aesthetic Culture, p. 372.
43 See Lukács: The Parting of the Ways, p. 173.
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and prettifying. He also does not acknowledge the possibility that impres-
sionism itself may contain value of its own as an aesthetic response to the 
ugliness and uniformity of urban industrialism. Instead, he sees it as serving 
little more than a momentary escapism for its pacified bourgeois consumers. 
However, what Lukács’s argument about impressionism touches on, which 
will later become a guiding preoccupation for critical theory, is the sense of 
powerlessness and fatalism associated with the relativization of value. Here 
he anticipates much of the Frankfurt School’s later condemnation of a trivial 
and uniform culture industry which serves only the satisfaction of desires 
and the pursuit of novelty, and which abandons the pursuit of loftier cul-
tural ends. What concerns Lukács perhaps most of all is the way the serious 
problems of his age, as he sees them, have become belittled by this culture, 
so that they now seem outdated. The aesthete may reject all demands for a 
greater and more enduring sense of significance and as metaphysical delu-
sions or even lies; they may insist fatalistically that »everything is equally 
false and differences can only exist in the composition«; and by this gesture 
the crisis of culture can even seem to be negated: »The feeling of eternal 
tragedy offers absolution for every frivolity.«44 For Lukács, though, this is a 
defeatist stance and a vicious circle. By refusing to see things as a crisis they 
can only drive the pathology deeper. It is like passively awaiting the Last 
Judgement with the blind confidence that ›everybody will be found light‹. 
Lukács even briefly nods at the redemptive possibilities of proletarian 
revolution, not as an expression of his political sympathies, but as a call 
for a ›healthy persecution‹ which could provoke a reaction of cultural re-
awakening:
That hope is that the barbarians come and tear apart all excessive refinements with their 
crude hands; that persecution might serve to sort and select [...]; that when a culture hates 
and opposes art, nevertheless art grows deeper. [...] By sweeping  everything peripheral 
away, it might lead us back to the truly essential [...].45
The idea seems to be that proletarian resistance to bourgeois society could 
amplify the crisis and throw light on the essence of the problem (the absence 
of form), thus obliging the abandonment of prettifying distractions. How-
ever, he concludes that this is unlikely to occur as socialism does not have 
the necessary mythic power that Christianity once had, and its culture only 
reproduces that of the bourgeoisie. He sees the socialist movement as, in 
its own way, ensnared within the same mechanized bureaucratic bourgeois 
world that it wants to escape from.
44 Lukács: Aesthetic Culture, p. 372, 375.
45 Ibid., p. 373.
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His final hope is that the tragedy of solitude endemic to the modern 
world can serve as the impetus for new forms of genuinely tragic art, as 
solitude itself becomes the common medium which art fixes upon. At this 
point his position comes closest to those of Simmel and Weber, who were 
not crisis thinkers in the sense that they did not think that exposure to the 
failure of form could stimulate a cultural reawakening. Instead they only 
acknowledged individual, ameliorative solutions. As Lukács remarks: »[...] 
the most important heroism, the heroism of forming oneself, grows from 
this solitude, just as the desire for, the possibility and reality of redemption 
grew from the knowledge of original sin. [...] Man can attain this redemp-
tion only by himself [...].«46
5. The Novel as Signal of Despair
The Theory of the Novel (Die Theorie des Romans, 1914–15)47 is an important 
work because it marks Lukács’s transition out of self-identified Platonism 
and into a historico-philosophical narrative. In Hegelian fashion, Lukács 
announces that philosophy itself is the symptom of a historical rift between 
inner world of the subject and external objectivity. It is »a sign of the essential 
difference between the self and the world, the incongruence of soul and deed 
[…]. Happy ages have no philosophy […]«.48 The chaos and contingency of 
life and the dead abstraction of form are not fixed metaphysical truths, but 
historical circumstances. Lukács’s understanding of the crisis changes from 
a modern failure to countenance the essential limits of life, to a philosophy 
of history – a narrative of humanity’s long fall from grace. The crisis this 
suggests is of an alienated life within a present that awaits future redemption.
Lukács compares the form of Homeric Greece, exemplified in the Iliad 
and Odyssey, to their modern equivalents, the novel. Homer shows us a ho-
mogeneous world of ready-made, coherent meaning.49 Every action within 
the Homeric epic is imbued with a sense of purpose. Each deflection of a 
sword’s blow, each slip of a foot, each move of the body finds itself purpo-
sively integrated within an ancient cosmology. As nothing occurs acciden-
tally and nothing belies explanation, the subject is not essentially different 
46 Ibid., p. 372.
47 Lukács: The Theory of the Novel.
48 Ibid., p. 29 (»[...] ein Zeichen der Wesensverschiedenheit von Ich und Welt, der Inkongruenz 
von Seele und Tat. Deshalb haben die seligen Zeiten keine Philosophie […]«, Die Theorie des 
Romans, p. 21).
49 Ibid., p. 32.
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from the world of objects. They share their being within what Hegel had 
called the ›ethical substance‹ (›Sittlichkeit‹) of ancient life. Each individual’s 
activity is continuous with others’. They relate to each other within a clear 
and understandable whole. For the epic hero, »a long road lies before him, 
but within him there is no abyss«.50 In an integrated world, problems en-
countered are only ever problems of distance, never of qualitative difference.
In his Aesthetics Hegel argues that the classical era represented the 
highest achievement of beauty because it managed to give expression to a 
harmonious fusion between the empirical external world and ›spirit‹ – the 
shared cultural world of concepts and ideas. It achieved this through anthro-
pomorphism, by investing every external event with human intentionality. 
Thus, the world of external nature appears as a conflict of will between 
human beings and anthropomorphic gods. There is an interpenetration 
of spirit and nature, and the meaning of every event becomes externally 
transparent.51 The classical epic can provide an answer to the question of 
»how […] life [can] become essential«.52
The ancient ethical substance, where the morality of human relations 
was a priori understood and unproblematic, could, for Hegel, be compared 
favourably against the rigid, conventional and formalized morality of bour-
geois modernity. However, there was no prospect of, nor desire to turn back 
the clock. Ancient ethical life was unenlightened and unaware of itself, and 
the sense of communal meaning it engendered was naively received, merely 
as unreflexive common-sense. It »consists precisely in immovably sticking to 
what is right and in abstaining from any movement, any undermining, and 
any reduction«.53 In contrast, any future ethical substance in an enlightened 
and sceptical modernity is possible only as a self-conscious and rational 
achievement; as a recognition of, and reconciliation with, complexity and 
ambiguity.
The extensive totality of the ancient world became problematic because 
it limited freedom to what can be achieved through external action, and 
hence did not allow room for reflection upon the significance of actions. 
Meaning is pre-given, and there is no space to challenge it. These limits of 
50 Ibid., p. 33 (»es liegt ein weiter Weg vor ihm, aber kein Abgrund in ihm«, Lukács: Die Theorie 
des Romans, p. 25).
51 Hegel: Aesthetics: p. 431.
52 Lukács: Theory of the Novel, p. 35 (»wie kann das Leben wesenhaft werden«, Lukács: Die Theorie 
des Romans, p. 27).
53 Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 251 (»besteht eben darin, unverrückt in dem fest zu 
beharren, was das Rechte ist, und sich alles Bewegens, Rüttelns und Zurückführens desselben 
zu enthalten«, Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 308–309).
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classical art come to a head in the dramas of Greek tragedy, where in Hegel’s 
typification, characters embodying ethical precept find themselves either 
at odds with others of contradictory ethics or with actuality. In the case of 
Sophocles’s Antigone, Hegel’s most famous example, Antigone comes to 
embody the old or divine pathos of family and myth, as opposed to Creon 
who embodies the new ethics of public order and the practical rationality 
and legitimacy of man-made political structures. The tragic consequences of 
each character one-sidedly following their interests is meant to demonstrate 
eternal justice; fateful and almost sacrificial retribution for their failure 
to harmonize interests. The tragedy itself functions as a reconciliation of 
conflict through the mutual destruction of protagonists, and a return to 
undisturbed harmony.
But the need for tragic outcomes to restore the immanence of essence 
suggests essence is losing its self-evidence.54 It attempts to reconcile the 
growing gap between being and essence by positing it as the intensive totality 
of an individual fate. However, it is a short step from this to the philosophy 
of Plato, where pathos is abstracted and formalised as ›ought‹ and coun-
tered against the ›is‹ of life. This is heightened further by the emergence of 
Christianity, which ontologizes the ›is‹ of Earthly life as something beneath 
the purity of heaven, the latter being where everything is as it should be. 
The only way we can achieve heavenly purity is through a leap into faith. 
Perseverance of doubt and demands for evidence is seen as a trait of a poor 
character in Christian doctrine; you can never know, you can only believe. 
To the Christian, the object of spirit (God) is unknowable. We therefore turn 
inwards, to an examination of the self as a source of faith alone that must 
overcome scepticism, akin to Hegel’s ›unhappy consciousness‹.55
Lukács uses this to contrast the classical world, where »great epic writing 
gives form to the extensive totality of life, [while] drama to the intensive 
totality of essence«, to the modern world where the individual appears at 
odds with their world, struggling to reconcile their longing for meaning.56 
Hegel describes romantic art as that which attempts to give representation 
to this inward struggle. The object becomes the spiritual beauty of the sub-
ject being represented. This is different from the more institutional ethical 
commitments of the protagonists of classical tragedy, as the substance of the 
romantic personality is not measured by the validity of the ethic they are 
54 Lukács: Theory of the Novel, p. 35–37.
55 Hegel: Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 281 (»unglückliches Bewußtsein«, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 
p. 375).
56 Lukács: Theory of the Novel, p. 46, 54 (»Die große Epik gestaltet die extensive Totalität des Lebens, 
das Drama die intensive Totalität der Wesenhaftigkeit.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 37, 40).
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prescribed to, but in the strength of their particular character; though both 
their commitment to duty and their resolve.57 The connection art has to a 
substantive and divine totality is increasingly severed, with God, especially 
after the Reformation, now consigned to the abstract beyond while art is 
preoccupied with exploring the integrity of particular human individuals. 
For Lukács, these conditions make true epics impossible, as the epic 
works through the revelation of a well-rounded all-embracing universe. For 
modern subjects, the world appears as contingent, incoherent and arbitrary. 
Their art consists of a struggle for inner meaning to find its expression in 
objects. This entails a choice: Either, it can proceed by narrowing its object 
to the point where the work can encompass it, thus creating an artificially 
limited, yet meaningful, world. This is the strategy of drama which, as we 
saw, becomes problematic once the shared pathos of the audience loses it 
force and the objective actions of protagonists themselves appear increas-
ingly arbitrary and meaningless and symptomatic of the very loss it is at-
tempting to overcome.58 Or art can accept the impossibility of giving form 
to the fullness of life and become explicit about the inability to achieve the 
total work. This is the strategy of the novel, which for Lukács is the defin-
itive form for modernity, as it attempts to give meaningful expression to 
the transcendental homelessness of the modern condition: »Every form is 
the resolution of the fundamental dissonance of existence, every form re-
stores the absurd to its proper place as the vehicle, the necessary condition 
of meaning.«59
Like the epic, the novel works extensively, by situating itself as an aspect 
of an existence that reaches beyond its own limits. This is in contrast with 
drama that works intensively by creating its own enclosed world in which 
every action can be internally related.60 But the historical reality means that 
»the objective structure of the world of the novel shows a heterogeneous 
totality, regulated only by regulative ideas, whose meaning is prescribed 
but not given«.61 For the novel, there is no a priori meaning to the world.
57 Hegel: Aesthetics, p. 553.
58 Lukács: Theory of the Novel, p. 61.
59 Ibid., p. 128 (»Jede Form ist die Auflösung einer Grunddissonanz des Daseins, eine Welt, in 
der das Widersinnige an seine richtige Stelle gerückt, als Träger, als notwendige Bedingung des 
Sinnes erscheint.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 52).
60 Ibid., pp. 50–54.
61 Ibid., p. 128 (»Die objektive Struktur der Romanwelt zeigt eine heterogene, nur von regulativen 
Ideen geregelte Totalität, deren Sinn nur aufgegeben, aber nicht gegeben ist.«, Die Theorie des 
Romans, p. 114).
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Hegel had argued that while modernity came at the cost of losing the 
heights of beauty represented by the symphony of meaning and existence 
in classical art, this loss was ultimately liberating. Modern artists are free 
from the fetters of representing an inscribed religious or mythical order 
and the human mind is now free to explore »the infinity of its feelings and 
situations«.62 This means we can go beyond reproducing an integrated 
pre-given totality and express the unrealised potential of »everything in 
which man as such is capable of being at home«.63 While the prospects of 
exceptional art were dim – a sort of groping around in the dark – the free-
dom this entailed was worth it.
Lukács shared Hegel’s view of art as a transcendental homecoming. 
However, he is somewhat less optimistic. For him, the loss of great art comes 
as no liberation at all. Rather it is a source of greater angst. Without any 
intrinsic structure to the world, the human individual is only left with the 
raw material of the self to work with. What the novel indicates is a twofold 
irony: It is the hopelessness of the struggle of form against its historical re-
ality, and at the same time, it is the hopelessness of any attempt to abandon 
reality and construct it anew:64
The novel is the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God. The novel’s hero psy-
chology is demonic; the objectivity of the novel is mature man’s knowledge that meaning 
can never quite penetrate reality, but that, without meaning, reality would disintegrate 
into the nothingness of inessentiality.65
The expression of soul into form depends on its historical context in 
a twofold way. The soul must develop within a historical moment condu-
cive to its reflection; it must be realistic about its ambitions. Moreover, the 
objective circumstances must be conducive to it; the soul must have the 
tools of expression at its disposal.66 In modernity, freedom from religious 
62 Hegel: Aesthetics, p. 607 (»die Unendlichkeit seiner Gefühle und Situationen«, Vorlesungen über 
die Ästhetik II, p. 238).
63 Hegel: Aesthetics, p. 607 (»alles, worin der Mensch überhaupt heimisch zu sein die Befähigung 
hat«, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik II, p. 238).
64 Lukács: Theory of the Novel, pp. 85–86 (»Der Roman ist die Epopöe der gottverlassenen Welt; die 
Psychologie des Romanhelden ist das Dämonische; die Objektivität des Romans die männlich 
reife Einsicht, daß der Sinn der Wirklichkeit niemals ganz zu durchdringen vermag, daß aber 
diese ohne ihn ins Nichts der Wesenlosigkeit zerfallen würde […].«, Die Theorie des Romans, 
p. 77).
65 Ibid., p. 88 (»Der Roman ist die Epopöe der gottverlassenen Welt; die Psychologie des Roman-
helden ist das Dämonische; die Objektivität des Romans die männlich reife Einsicht, daß der 
Sinn die Wirklichkeit niemals ganz zu durchdringen vermag, daß aber diese ohne ihn ins Nichts 
der Wesenlosigkeit zerfallen würde […]«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 77).
66 Ibid., p. 92.
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or mythical doctrine means ideals are free to develop to their fullest extent, 
as Hegel had declared. However, the conditions for actualisation are absent, 
with the modern soul being trapped by rationalization, where the purposes 
of actions are determined by the objective imperatives of the machine or 
the strictures of social convention. The novel is the quintessential modern 
form in the truest sense, as it is defined by a contextual impossibility of 
achieving transcendental harmony. The structure of the novel corresponds 
with the structure of its time.67
Lukács then offers a typology of strategies of the novel, categorized 
either by a definition of the soul as too narrow or as to broad in its relation 
to the world. In the first case, described as ›abstract idealism‹, alienation is 
seen as a purely external problem, with the interior of the self remaining a 
simple, harmonious unity. This is to pose the outside world as little more 
than a series of challenges that the outgoing, striving individual must meet.68 
It is the narrative of the adventurer, who never stops to contemplate their 
inner integrity, but confronts the entire world, seeing it as »bewitched by 
evil demons and that the spell can be broken, and reality can be redeemed 
either by finding the magic password or by courageously fighting the evil 
forces«.69 Unlike the epic hero, modern adventurers are not guided along 
by fates or gods, but instead face the world completely alone, as isolated 
individuals. They fulfil their own singular destiny within a fragmentary, 
hostile world of natural forces and petrified human conventions.
The best representative of this is contained in Don Quixote, which, 
Lukács insists, must be understood as a product of its historical juncture: 
the breakup of the medieval worldview and the loss of Chivalric culture. 
Cervantes makes a mockery of the ›trivial‹ medieval epic by turning its 
world – a world of honour, duty and heroism ordained by God – into the 
delusions of a madman.70 In the battle against the external world, Don Quix-
ote simply refashions it into whatever fits his vision. Cervantes’s moment as 
a time of transition means the hero never has to confront the truth of his 
delusions, but Lukács claims that this is something that cannot be afforded 
to works of later modernity.
The other type of novel, defined by an overly expansive soul, Lukács 
describes as ›romanticism of disillusionment‹. This is significant because it 
67 Ibid., p. 93.
68 Ibid., pp. 97–99.
69 Ibid., p. 97 (»das von bösen Dämonen vollbracht, durch das Finden des lösenden Wortes oder 
durch das mutige Bekämpfen der Zaubermächte zur Entzauberung und Erlösung geführt werden 
kann«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 83).
70 Ibid., p.101.
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emerges in the 19th century, once God is well and truly dead, and begins to 
problematize the integrity of the soul itself, rather than its relationship with 
action. In this type, alienation has been driven deeper; from the struggle to 
express the inner sense of significance in external objects, to the struggle to 
find any coherence and transparency of the inner world with itself. The pro-
tagonist of this type of novel must wrestle with their inner demons, as they 
confront themselves in a psychological drama. It marks the replacement of 
the »sensuously meaningful story by psychological analysis«; a rationalistic 
interrogation of the self.71 Individualism has reached its apogee. The novel 
is longer an abstract idealism, as the subject’s inner world is no longer the 
bearer of some transcendental generality. Now it is entirely particular and 
perspectival. In the 20th century, everything is psychological.
Lukács considers the work of Tolstoy as an attempt to overcome the 
limitations of the novel, particularly the character of Levin in Anna Ka-
renina. Levin attempts to escape the meaninglessness of bourgeois cultural 
conventionality by looking for fulfilment in the rhythms of nature. However, 
this is soon revealed as paradoxical, as it is only from the perspective of 
human culture that the need for this move can be conceived of and therefore 
carried out. The character becomes aware of his inability to retreat into an 
idyllic and naive peasant life and must instead reconcile himself with his 
bourgeois existence and responsibilities and its entwinement with those of 
others.72 For Lukács, Tolstoy fails because he centres his holism on nature 
rather than in forms of culture.
Lukács ends by suggesting Dostoyevsky may offer the solution. It is in 
Dostoyevsky’s characters, who eschew life lived according to convention, 
and live as if moved by a divine inner calling, that Lukács sees redemption 
in modernity. In this way, Lukács claims Dostoyevsky has gone beyond the 
novel, to a new form that is higher and more fully realised. But his dialectic 
still insists that the realisation of this is not something bought about by 
the work itself; we must resist the urge to see works of art as superseding 
each other along a path of linear aesthetic progression. Dostoyevsky is not 
a negation of the novel into a higher form; if he is anything, he is a signal 
of potential things to come: »Art can never be the agent of such a transfor-
mation: the great epic is a form bound to the historical moment, and any 
71 Ibid., p. 113 (»der Ersatz der sinnlich gestalteten Fabel durch psychologische Analyse«, Die 
Theorie des Romans, p. 99).
72 Ibid., p. 147.
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attempt to depict the utopian as existent can only end in destroying the 
form, not in creating reality.«73
6. Conclusion
In a letter he wrote to a friend during 1913, Lukács states that »Germany 
today is not in possession of a profound and fruitful ›Weltanschauung‹ that 
would encompass and embrace both the artist and the public«.74 In this pa-
per, we have traced this general sentiment of metaphysical homelessness to 
demonstrate how it echoes as a leitmotif throughout young Lukács’s writing. 
It is a sentiment that becomes, especially after the First World War, collap-
sible by many thinkers under the master-category of ›crisis‹ and thereby 
registered as the problem faced by modernity.75 This also becomes a lynchpin 
of Lukács’s Marxism. In History and Class Consciousness, the cultural and 
ethical alienation that Lukács sought representation of were written up as 
symptoms of a society that was ordered through the commodity-form. The 
»contemplative stance«76 of the bourgeois mind-set captures this circum-
stance – especially the subjectivation of judgement – while historicizing it 
as the pathology of a particular social class whose world-historical time had 
passed. ›Crisis‹ performs as a diagnosis of this condition, and a springboard 
that spurs the proletariat out of it via revolutionary action.77 This achieves 
what art never could. Hence, any appreciation of Lukács’s early Marxism 
should begin with an understanding of his prior thinking, as the turn to 
Bolshevism constituted an effort to bring the enigmas of his young thought 
under conceptual control.
73 Ibid., p. 152 (»Aber diese Wandlung kann niemals von der Kunst aus vollzogen werden: die 
große Epik ist eine an die Empirie des geschichtlichen Augenblicks gebundene Form und jeder 
Versuch, das Utopische als seiend zu gestalten, endet nur formzerstörend, aber nicht wirklich-
keitschaffend.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 137).
74 Lukács: Selected Correspondence, 1902–1920, pp. 217–218.
75 See esp. Valery: The Crisis of the Mind, p. 23.
76 Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, p. 98 (»kontemplative Haltung«, Geschichte und Klas-
senbewußtsein, p. 264).
77 Gilbert: Crisis Paradigm.
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